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trial may be had with fairness to the different parties." 5 The Appellate Division in its decision restricts the operation of this section
so that it cannot apply to all cases in the municipal court. The
question is now before the Court of Appeals for final determination 6
but it is doubtful whether a result different from that of the Appellate Division will be found. The practice frowned upon is barred
upon sufficient though technical grounds and cannot be permitted under
the present procedure. Remedial legislation giving the court jurisdiction in cases of this nature appears to be the only solution.

TAXATION-FRATERNAL

EDUCATIONAL

ASSOCIATION

PROVIDING

HOME FOR STUDENTS BELONGING TO FRATERNITY NOT ENTITLED TO TAX
EXEMPTION AS A BENEFICENT AND CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION.-

The plaintiff sought to tax the real property of the defendant,
which claimed exemption under paragraph 7 of section 2 of the
Revenue Act of Illinois (Cahill's Rev. Stat. 1925, p. 1998) providing
that "all property of institutions of public charity, all property of
beneficent and charitable organization, * * * when such property
is actually and exclusively used for such charitable or beneficent
purposes, and not leased or otherwise used with a view to profit"
shall be exempt from taxation. The defendant was a fraternal
educational association conducted, not for pecuniary profit, but for
the purpose, as stated in its charter, of providing a home for student
members of the fraternity, at a moderate cost to those able to pay
and gratuitously to those unable to pay. The highest rate charged
was shown at the trial to be lower than the cost of similar ac6ommodations elsewhere in the locality. Its officers served without compensation and no dividends or profit accrued to any member of the
fraternity. The property consisted of a house in the city of Chicago
occupied by members of the fraternity attending the University of
Chicago, and was acquired by donations from alumni members and
a mortgage on the premises. It was maintained partly by members
attending school and partly by donations from alumni. The trial
court rendered judgment for the plaintiff, holding that defendant was
not an institution of public charity, nor a beneficent and charitable
organization, so as to be exempt from taxation under the Revenue
Act. This decision was affirmed on appeal. People ex rel. Carr,
County Collector v. Alpha Pi of Phi Kappa Sigma Educational
Ass'n. of University of Chicago, 158 N. E. 213 (Illinois, 1927).
The question at issue in this case was whether or not the defendant was an institution of public charity, or a beneficent and
charitable organization, as contemplated by the Revenue Act. It is
requisite to a public charity that it be for the benefit of the public
or some portion thereof, but it is not necessary that a charity should
be open to every one in the community.' Since it is the duty of the
public to care for the indigent and the poor, any institution which
5

Akely v. Kinnicutt, 238 N. Y. 466, 144 N. E. 682 (1924).
'Motion for leave to appeal to Court of Appeals granted, 221 App.
Div. 761.
S11 C. J. 338.

RECENT DECISIONS
serves no selfish interest but discharges in whole or in part any such
duty is a public charity. 2 It was not urged by the defendant that a
college fraternity is a public charity, but it contended that it was a
beneficent and charitable organization and ought, on that ground,
to be exempt from taxation. The authorities of the various jurisdictions are agreed that in determining whether property is to be
exempt from taxation, the statutes providing for exemptions are to
be strictly construed;3 and that the burden of proof is on the party
seeking to bring himself within the statute.4 The facts in each individual case, as to the use to which the property is put, govern.
Stone, J., in his opinion in the instant case, lays down as the broad
reason for exempting certain property from public taxation the fact
that the use of such property for charitable purposes tends to lessen
the burden of government and so affects the public welfare; that the
charitable and beneficial organizations contemplated in the Revenue
Act are those which fulfill that purpose; and that the defendant does
not fulfill that purpose and so does not bring itself within the purview and intent of the act. There are decisions in other jurisdictions holding that property belonging to such organizations as the
defendant is tax exempt but in those cases there was no attempt
to bring the organizations within the respective statutes as beneficent
or charitable institutions. In one case the statute exempted Greek
letter fraternities associated with educational institutions of higher
learning,5 and in another case the statute exempted literary clubs or
associations connected with colleges or universities., There is one
decision, however, which cannot be reconciled with the case under
review.7 The facts relative to the purpose and conduct of the
fraternal organizations in each case are practically identical. Both
statutes make the basis of exemption the benevolent and charitable
purpose of the institutions. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held
that the fraternity in that case was an organization whose property
was used solely for the promotion of educational, moral, charitable
and public welfare, and was therefore exempt from taxation. It is
submitted that the Oklahoma decision puts the fairer construction upon
the facts. An institution which assists its membership in establishing
themselves in life, brings them under the influence of education,
and extends credit to those otherwise unable to complete their education surely affects public welfare. In New York the levying of taxes
for the support of public colleges and institutions of higher learning
has been upheld.8 The maintenance of such institutions has, it would
'Grand Lodge v. Board of Review, 228 Il1. 480, 117 N. E. 1016 (1917).
'People v. Deutsche Gemeinde, 249 Ill. 132, 94 N. E. 162 (1911);
People, ex rel. Trustees of Masonic Hall and Asylum Fund v. Farrell,
et aL., 223 N. Y. Supp. 660 (Sup. Ct., 1927).
4
Knox College v. Board of Review of Knox County, 308 Ill. 160, 139
N. E. 56 (1923).
'State v. Allen, 127 N. E. 145 (Indiana, 1920).
'Kappa Kappa Gamma House Ass'n v. Peary, 92 Kan. 1020, 142
Pac. 294 (1914).
"Beta Theta Pi Corporation v. Board of Com'rs of Cleveland
County, 234 Pac. 354 (Oklahoma, 1925).
'Matter of College of City of New York v. Hylan, 205 A. D. 372.
199 N. Y. Supp. 804, aff'd. 236 N. Y. 594 (1923).
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appear, become a burden of government. In view of the inability,
financial and otherwise, of public institutions of higher education to
accommodate the increasing number of students seeking their benefits,
it does not seem unreasonable to say that an organization of the
type under discussion, which makes it possible for those of limited
means to secure an education, to some extent lessens the burden of
government. By such acts it denotes itself a beneficent and charitable organization and should bring itself within the statutes exempting property from taxation.

TORTS-NEGLIGENT LANGUAGE--BREACH OF DUTY TO GIVE CORRECT

INFORMATION.-Plaintiff expected an importation on a certain vessel and
arranged with the defendant to store the goods on one of its piers. Before
the railroad took delivery of the goods from the steamship, one of
plaintiff's officers called defendant on the telephone and informed
it that he was desirous of obtaining insurance on the goods while
in its care and asked where the goods were stored. The defendant,
taking time to obtain the required information, replied that they were
docked at Pier "F". In fact defendant had not yet received the
goods. Neither plaintiff nor defendant knew this. Plaintiff procured
insurance for the goods naming Pier "F" as the warehouse. Later
the goods were received by the defendant and placed on Pier "D"
which subsequently, with the goods thereon, was destroyed by fire.
Plaintiff could not collect the insurance. It seeks to recover the loss
from the defendant Held, that plaintiff established a cause of action
for negligence. A negligent statement as well as a negligent act may
be made the basis for a recovery of damages in such cases where
there is a duty, if one speaks at all, to give the correct information.
International Products Company v. Erie Railroad Company, 244 N. Y.
331, 155 N. E. 231 (1927).
In England it is well settled that there is no liability for negligence in word as distinguished from act.1 Earlier English cases contained dicta to the effect that such a cause of action was maintainable,2 but it was decided by the House of Lords in 1889 3 that no
action could be- based upon a mere statement although untrue and
although acted upon to the damage of the person to whom the state-4
ment was made, unless the speaker knew the statement to be false.
And the same principle has been applied in equity. 5 The American
Courts and writers have been more liberal 6 and have permitted in
some instances the maintenance of such an action. The Court, in the
'Pollock on Torts, 12th ed., p. 565; Fish v. Kelly, 17 C. B., N. S.
194 (1864).
'Burrowes v. Lock, 10 Ves. 471 (1805); Slim v. Croucher, 1 De G.,
F & J. 518 (1866).
' Peek v. Derry, L. R., 14 A. C. 335 (1889).
'Dickson v. Reuters Telegraph Co., L. R., 3 C. P. Div. 1 (1877).
'Low v. Bouverie, L. R., 3 Ch. 82 (1891).
'Dickle v. Abstract Co., 89 Tenn. 431 (1890); Edwards v. Lamb,
69 N. H. 599 (1899); Herriolt v. Plimpton, 166 Mass. 585 (1896); Landie
v. Telegraph Co., 126 N. C. 431 (1900) ; Bailey v. Tel. Co., 227 Pa. St. 522
(1910).

